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Purpose of Panel 
Panel 5B was created t o  evaluate the need of corrective action and 
proposed hardware implementation as required. This panel reviewed the 
results of other panels, primarily the Spacecraft Incident Investigation 
a d  the Related Systans Evaluation t o  detenuine the desirabili ty of 
collducting specific studies. These studies w i l l  be defined in d e t a i l  
t o  the contractar and coordination and review of the reau l t s  managed by 
the penel. After canpletion of the various reviews, appropalate hard- 
ware implementation action w i l l  be prepared fo r  disposition by the 
Apollo ConPiguration Control Board. 
M e m b e r s  of Panel 5B met with Ranel 6 on May 18, 1970, t o  review the 
first draf t  of Panel 6 conclusions and recanmendat ions. Specifically, 
there were no recamendations for  IM hardware change. Dving the dis-- 
cussions it beceme apparent that  there are items tha t  require further 
study. These items are discussed i n  the following paragraphs. 
1. Descent Stage Propellant Quantity Gaging System (PQGS) 
The only area i n  I44 pressure vessel systems identified as  normally 
having oxidizer, nometall ic materials, and an energy source together 
is  the descent stage propellant quantity gaging system (FQGS). The 
PQSS is  a capacitence measuring device which normally dissipates 1 t o  
10 microwatts of energy t o  the fuel/axidizer. Nonml operating current 
supplied t o  the sensor electronics is 54 ma a t  20.5 volts (1.1 watts). 
. The device i s  current-limited t o  300 ma. Single-point fa i lure  snalysis 
has shown that a fai led FQGS cannot provide the e lec t r ica l  energy 
r e q ~ i r e d  t o  induce tank failure. Teflon and Rulon used i n  the FQGS are 
exposed t o  the fuel/midizer. Further compatibility testing of these 
materials is  being conducted. Grumman Aerospace krporat ion has been 
requested t o  in~zs t iga te  a l t e rmte  materials for  each. No failures of 
the types postulated have ever been experienced- on the p s m .  
2. Ascent Stage Propellant Lov-Level Detectar 
The case of the ascent stage propellant law-level detectar (APS PLD) 
isolates the electronics from fuel  and oxidizer during normal operation. 
A case fai lure  of the completely encloeed electronics of this device 
would expose. the electronics t o  fuel/oxidizer. Worst case energy input 
under the conditions wFuld be 7 watts. The device is current-limited t o  
250 ma by a fuse. The propellant level  de*ctor has cever experienced 
any applicable failure,suggesting f lu id  breakthrough or excessive f lu id  
heating due t o  electronic failure. Its intended purpose is t o  give wernicg 
t o  close the RCS interconnects due to  *ding propellant depletion, but - 
t h i s  is presently cued by APS b?rm procedure timeline. Resent require- 
ments for  the APS PLD should be evaluated and the units removed i f  neceasaqj. 
Future mission plans could incarpmate s short-time rendezvous that  
necessitates restart of the ascent engines and the low-leuel detector 
uill be required. 
3- Loss of Thermal Shields 
Cariplete loss  CZ t h e m 1  protection around the gaseous hel',um tanks 
coupled with direct solar impingement could cause burst pressillres i n  the 
tanks; these tanks do not have pressure re l ie f  provisions. Undetected 
failures modes which would cause the complete loss of thermal protection 
are  considered extremely improbable with the most probable being internal 
overpressure due t o  inadequate venting of the shields . If t h i s  case 
occurre;d, the fai lure  would be a rupture in the blanket (delta of 0.1 psid) 
which would relieve the pressure before the blanket could be pulled loose 
fran the standoffs. C;nmman has been requested t o  investigate the 
additional protection which could be provided by a thermal  overwrap of 
the tanks. 
4. Batteries 
As a resul t  af tde battery investigation it was revealed tha t  batteries 
have not been considered a s  pressure vessels and, therefore, were not burst- 
tested as  pert  af the developtent or ualification propan. There i s  an 
iuccsistency i n  the case of the py-ro H) battery in that tile case is leak 
checked t o  only 15 psi and then a 30 5 rel ief  valve is imtal led.  There- 
fore, case pressure integrity is not demonstrated t o  re l ie f  valve capebility. 
Prior t e s t s  indicate that  the burst would be a pressure relieving s p l i t  
a& not an explosive burst. EESC w i l l  conduct burst. tests on a l l  space- 
c ra f t  batteries. A modification of the acceptance pressure t e s t  of €he 
batteries is being investigated by GrrPlmLan. 
5. Pressure Transducers 
Pressure transducers have not been considered pressure vessels and, 
therefore, have not been burst-tested. However, these devices, which 
are  used i n  the GOX and propellant systems, are acceptance tested t o  1-a times design operating,and design burst is 5 times owrating pressure. 
Investigation has centered around postulating a leaking diaphragm which 
would cause the tank fluid t o  cane i n  contact with nonmetallic materials 
and an energy. ssource. Calculations by Grumnan have shown that  assuming 
a leak and combustion, there is  enouqh energy i n  the materials i n  the 
cavity t o  rupture the transducer structure. There are two types of trans- 
ducers used - one a Bourdon tube device (-601) and the other a diaphram/ 
atrain gage device (-624). 
as sum in^^, e lectr icel  f a i l - se s ,  t2e raergy a ~ ~ i l s t v k  in the cavity differs  
slightly. 
The -601 m&imum operating current is 1.0 ma a t  28 vdc maximum power 
which could be drawn assuming single-point fa i lure  is 200 ma, a t  which 
time a 147-ohm resistor would open. Maximum sustainable current for  the 
resis tor  is  60 ma, which results i n  1.6-watt heat dissipetion. 
The -624 maximum operating current i s  10 ma a t  28~. Assuming single- 
point fa i lure ,  the maximum current that  could be drawn is C\. 15 a, a t  
which time a 221--ahm resis tor  would b u m  open, temimting.  t3s current 
flow. The highes b sustaimble current is 46 ma, which causes 1.3 va t t s  
of beat. 
Grumnan is currently investigating whether these postulated con- 
ditions could cause canbustion. Tests on meterials present i n  the cavit?. 
w i l l  be codducted a t  WSllF i n  the presence of GOX a d  propellants. 
Possible transducer t e s t s  v i th  fai led diaphra- are being considered. 
Grumman states  that  t h i s  class of t,rszsCicer has never 2cmred any 
applicable failure, s * w e s t i  n~ ilriiii breakthrough or excessive f luid 
heating duc tu electrc-nic failure.  
6. Temperature Sensors 
The case of the jmnersion temperature sensor used i n  the propellant 
systans completely isolates the electronics from fuel  and oxidizer during 
normel operations. A case fai lure  af t h i s  device would expose the 
electronics t o  propellants. Normal operating power of th i s  device is 
0.5 ina a t  8.5 vdc. The meximum power that can be delivered as the resul t  
@f c i rcu i t  failure is 0.0085 watts. Grmman is currently investigating 
whether these postulated conditions could cause combustion. Grumman 
states  that  t h i s  class transducer bas never incurred any apglicable 
failure,  suggesting f lu id  breektbrougb or excessive heating due t o  
electronic failure.  
Conclusions 
A t  t h i s  time it does no% appear tha t  there is  aPy reason t o  ch~nge 
It4 configuration or procedures. However, the investigations and t e s t s  
mentioned should'be completed a d  f ina i  conclusions ?IcmmiLated. If 
results indicate potential hardware change, the proposed changes w i l l  
be immediately expedited t o  the Configuration Control Board. 
Rec ammendation 
The recanmendations of the panel were as follows: 
1. No modifications t o  IM hardware or procedures are recamended 
a t  this  time as a resul t  of this  investigation. 
2. HSC should continue investigating the desirabi l i ty  of inert ing 
the ascent stage propellant lav-level detector and report recatmendations 
t o  the Configuration Control Board. 
3. MSC should continue investigating possible tank thermal wrap and 
report recommendations t o  the Configuration Control Board. 
4. MSC should run battery-case burst tests and investigate reasonable 
ATP changes and report recamnendations t o  the Configuration Control Board. 
5 .  S C  should continue failure-modes investigations and possible 
fa i lure  tests of pressure t ra~edzcers  srG reyurt recanmendatione t o  the 
Cafiguration Control Board. 
6. WC should continue nometallic-materials tes t ing a t  for 
transducer cavity materials i n . t h e  presence of GOX and propellant and 
report findings and recamnendations t o  the Configuration Control Board. 
.7. Nometallic materials which have been cer t i f ied for  % application 
by the MSFC ambient pressure IOX t e s t s  should be cer t i f ied using the '  
WSrP GOX t e s t  a t  operating pressures as rapidly as  possible. 
